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concept of an operational level of war,
that effectively support the tactics-andstrategy dialectic, in turn serving to manage the complexities of modern warfare.
Unfortunately, Friedman’s argument
paints a picture of the concepts underpinning military theory and doctrine as
being static and unchanging. Yet military
theory is not static, and doctrine changes
under the pressures of experience and
critical thinking to provide pragmatic
utility. No theory or doctrine should
be dogmatic, especially in the conduct
of war, and this truism applies to the
concept of the operational level of war
as well. Even though it was wrongly
adopted into doctrine, the concept of
an operational level of war has evolved
beyond its original formulation. In
the absence of addressing directly the
interrelationships among levels, related
objectives, and operational art itself, his
argument is left weaker than it could
have been. As long as there is utility to be
found in applying any concept to create
and execute military plans effectively,
that concept has a purpose in military
thinking and should be retained.
On Operations outlines a way to
understand and manage war. The work is
ambitious and covers significant territory
in roughly two hundred pages. This work
will generate controversy among practitioners of operational planning—who, in
fact, should be challenged to justify the
value and existence of the operationallevel-of-war concept. Friedman’s work
adds to the body of military thinking
about operational art and the operational
level of war. It should appeal to military
staffs, and planners in particular, who
desire to widen their professional
knowledge about operational art and
the theory and doctrine that support it.
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Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of
China’s Last Golden Age, by Stephen R. Platt. New
York: Knopf, 2018. 592 pages. $17.

In modern Chinese history, few subjects
are discussed as widely and misunderstood as broadly as the so-called
Century of Humiliation, which ostensibly commenced with China’s defeat in
the First Opium War (1839–42). Most
academic analyses of the Century of Humiliation’s genesis emphasize economic
and technological disparities, inevitable
clashes of contrasting civilizations, or,
broadly, the tide of European imperialism. Historian Stephen Platt, however,
has sought to examine the prelude
to the Opium War comprehensively
through the eyes of the individuals who
drove early Anglo-Chinese relations.
Imperial Twilight is concerned not with
the Opium War itself but with how it
came to occur. Platt posits two essential
questions along which he aligns his
work. The first examines how Britain
came to fight a war with China for the
sake of merchants who were trafficking
illegal drugs, despite visceral domestic
opposition. The second seeks to
determine how China declined from its
peerless geopolitical position in the eighteenth century and, in turn, how Britain
came to take advantage of that decline.
Within this framework, Platt examines
the early history of Anglo-Chinese trade
and diplomatic relations, beginning with
the establishment of the canton system
in 1759 and ending in the aftermath
of the Opium War. At the same time,
Platt relates the various internal crises
faced by the Qing Empire, from the
White Lotus Rebellion to rampant
piracy in China’s southern littoral.
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Notably, however, Platt’s discussion
of the evolution of the relationship
between Britain and China is driven
by the actions of individuals of both
nations from 1759 to 1842. Platt asserts
that the Opium War in no way resulted
from an inevitable clash of cultures,
much less a premeditated imperialist
plot; rather, the war represents a tragic
culmination of mounting domestic
crises taxing the resources of the Qing
Empire coupled with the successful
lobbying of the British Parliament by
private merchants to protect their illicit
businesses, despite many Westerners’
genuinely felt, albeit misinformed,
admiration of Chinese civilization.
Platt’s work is eminently readable, using
concise language and driven by the
engaging individual personalities of
those involved in Britain’s burgeoning
trade with China. His inclusion of both
British and Chinese perspectives, in
relatively equal allotments, grounds the
work’s approach to understanding how
a mutual relationship between the states
was established and evolved. The author
relies extensively on both English- and
Chinese-language primary sources,
lending credibility to his accounts
and interpretations. At the same
time, Platt’s emphasis on the role that
individuals played in the Anglo-Chinese
relationship reminds readers that the
greatest events in history often are
triggered by happenstance and subject
to unintended consequences rather
than resulting from methodical plans.
Perhaps the most notable contribution
of Platt’s work is the comprehensive
debunking of any association between
premeditated grand imperialist plans
for China and the Opium War. Early
in Imperial Twilight, Platt presents the
reader with a discussion of the amazing admiration that the West felt for
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China prior to the war. In recounting
many writings from major Western
Enlightenment figures, such as Adam
Smith, George Washington, and Voltaire,
Platt demonstrates to readers that
China—rightfully so—was revered as
the world’s largest, most prosperous,
and best-governed state during the
eighteenth century. This fact was the
foundation for Britain’s efforts to engage
China diplomatically and economically.
Nonetheless, many of the key individuals
driving closer relations between Britain
and China, such as George T. Staunton,
did so primarily out of their own
personal interests, not at the behest of
London. Regarding the eventual war
itself, Platt relates the intense opposition
from members of the British public
and Parliament, firmly rooted on moral
grounds, that persisted throughout the
short conflict. Ultimately, Platt argues
convincingly that the decision to go to
war, which succeeded by only five votes
in the House of Commons, was rooted in
the moneyed interests of private opium
merchants responding to a renewed
clampdown on their trade. In doing
so, Platt undercuts proponents of the
narrative portraying the Opium War as
a plot to initiate China’s subjugation and,
in turn, the Century of Humiliation.
The primary shortcoming of Imperial
Twilight is its apparent lack of a distinct
conclusion. The work begins by posing
its two questions, and centers on them;
however, after the historical narrative
culminates in the final chapter, the work
fails to revisit these ordering questions
explicitly. While Platt’s emphasis
on the role of individuals and their
intergenerational relations is refreshing
among modern histories that tend to
overemphasize trends and forces, the
book’s limited consideration of structural
factors undermines its ability to marshal
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the panoply of evidence provided to
establish definitive answers to the
original questions. Furthermore, Platt’s
brief treatment of the consequences
of the war itself may not convince the
reader that the conflict truly marked
the turning point of China’s last golden
age, as the book’s subtitle suggests.
However, Platt is successful in reminding
modern readers of the many unknowns
that remain regarding the eighteenthand nineteenth-century worlds; the
capricious nature of the process by which
interstate relationships emerge; and the
dangers that arise when wealth bleeds
into politics to entice governments to
take action, however contrary to public
opinion those actions may be—a lesson
modern readers would do well to heed.
BENJAMIN E. MAINARDI

Admiral Gorshkov: The Man Who Challenged
the U.S. Navy, by Norman Polmar, Thomas A.
Brooks, and George E. Fedoroff. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2019. 304 pages. $38.95.

This book is long overdue. Few individuals have put their personal stamp on an
aspect of world affairs as conclusively as
Sergey G. Gorshkov, who almost singlehandedly developed the Soviet navy
from a gaggle of vessels and competing
strategies into one of the most formidable forces in maritime history. For
nearly three decades, the Soviet navy was
his navy and Soviet naval strategy was
his strategy. No other figure in maritime
history can quite compare in how
completely he created a military service.
For U.S. naval officers serving during the
latter half of the Cold War, Gorshkov’s
navy was the only real threat. It was not
a question of whether the Soviet and U.S.
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fleets would clash, but only of when. At
sea, U.S. tactical action officers served
as living computers, memorizing the
entire Soviet naval and air orders of
battle—from the peculiarities of ship
and aircraft types to weapons systems to
electronic sensors—to enable them to
deal with a bewildering complexity of
threats in as rapid and effective a manner
as possible. The U.S. Navy’s initial role in
the predicted war for Europe would have
been to move ten Army divisions and
their equipment across the Atlantic in ten
days while running a gauntlet of Soviet
submarines, fleets of Badger and Backfire
bombers, and cruise-missile-firing
surface ships. It is fitting that former
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
wrote the foreword to Admiral Gorshkov,
as it was Lehman’s six-hundred-ship
Navy that was going to have to match
and defeat Gorshkov’s fleet. Under
Lehman, the U.S. Navy embraced a much
more offensive-minded way of thinking
and prepared not only to get the Army
across the Atlantic but to harry the
Soviet flanks while destroying the USSR’s
maritime forces wherever they were.
The authors have delivered a riveting
account of the growth of the Soviet
fleet. They chronicle how Stalin’s desire
for major warships gave way to a more
defensive, coastal, and submarinebased strategy, only to return to a big,
blue-water idea. Gorshkov’s forces
were designed and built neither for
maritime supremacy nor for sea control,
but these would come as the fruits of
victory if the Soviet navy could achieve
its mission: destroying the U.S. Navy,
primarily by sinking its aircraft carriers. Whether it could have done so
remains a matter of conjecture; that the
Soviets would have failed in the effort
remains a matter of faith among most
Cold War–vintage U.S. naval officers.
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